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Cooperation In Public Goods Games Predicts Behavior In Incentive‐Matched Binary Dilemmas: Evidence For Stable Prosociality

Author

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  • Timothy L. Mullett
  • Rebecca L. McDonald
  • Gordon D.A. Brown

Abstract

We report the results of an experiment in which subjects completed second mover public goods game tasks and second mover binary social dilemma tasks. Each task was completed under three different incentive structures which were matched across tasks. The use of nonlinear incentive structures, along with a novel categorization method, allowed us to identify behavioral subtypes that cannot be distinguished using conventional linear incentive structures. We also examined how well behavior could be predicted across tasks. Subjects' average conditional cooperation levels showed significant cross‐task predictability and stability. However, almost a third of responses (28%) demonstrated unambiguous preference reversals across tasks. We argue that prosociality is best described as an individual‐level trait, similar to risk aversion in choice under risk. (JEL C7, C91, H41)

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy L. Mullett & Rebecca L. McDonald & Gordon D.A. Brown, 2020. "Cooperation In Public Goods Games Predicts Behavior In Incentive‐Matched Binary Dilemmas: Evidence For Stable Prosociality," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(1), pages 67-85, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:58:y:2020:i:1:p:67-85
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12796
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    Cited by:

    1. Malte Baader & Simon Gaechter & Kyeongtae Lee & Martin Sefton, 2022. "Social preferences and the variability of conditional cooperation," Discussion Papers 2022-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Gächter, Simon & Fages, Diego Marino, 2023. "Using the Strategy Method and Elicited Beliefs to Explain Group Size and MPCR Effects in Public Good Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 16605, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Wang, Chaoqian & Pan, Qiuhui & Ju, Xinxiang & He, Mingfeng, 2021. "Public goods game with the interdependence of different cooperative strategies," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    4. Simon Gaechter & Kyeongtae Lee & Martin Sefton, 2022. "The Variability of Conditional Cooperation in Sequential Prisoner's Dilemmas," Discussion Papers 2022-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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