IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecinqu/v57y2019i3p1497-1509.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Left For Dead: Anti‐Competitive Behavior In Orbital Space

Author

Listed:
  • Nodir Adilov
  • Brendan M. Cunningham
  • Peter J. Alexander
  • Jerry Duvall
  • Daniel R. Shiman

Abstract

In a dynamic investment framework with depreciation, we show incumbent satellite operators have incentives to “warehouse” a fraction of their assigned spectrum and orbital slots, keeping nonoperational assets in place, which reduces output, increases prices, and diminishes social welfare. Exploring three distinct market structures, we model firms' incentives to warehouse, and show conditions under which firms choose to warehouse rather than replace nonfunctioning satellites. We find a dominant firm with a competitive fringe produces more and longer duration warehousing relative to perfect competition or monopoly. Regulators could remediate warehousing by increasing a firm's marginal costs, or by increasing the probability of reallocating orbital slots that do not have a fully functioning satellite. (JEL L9, L5)

Suggested Citation

  • Nodir Adilov & Brendan M. Cunningham & Peter J. Alexander & Jerry Duvall & Daniel R. Shiman, 2019. "Left For Dead: Anti‐Competitive Behavior In Orbital Space," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1497-1509, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:3:p:1497-1509
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12790
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12790
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecin.12790?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:57:y:2019:i:3:p:1497-1509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.