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Dividend Policy In Regulated Network Industries: Evidence From The Eu

Author

Listed:
  • Francisca Bremberger
  • Carlo Cambini
  • Klaus Gugler
  • Laura Rondi

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="ecin12238-abs-0001"> We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost-based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive-regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost-based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency-enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JEL G35, L51, L32, L9)

Suggested Citation

  • Francisca Bremberger & Carlo Cambini & Klaus Gugler & Laura Rondi, 2016. "Dividend Policy In Regulated Network Industries: Evidence From The Eu," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(1), pages 408-432, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:54:y:2016:i:1:p:408-432
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.2016.54.issue-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giulia Romano & Andrea Guerrini, 2019. "Paying Returns to Shareholders of Water Utilities: Evidence from Italy," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(7), pages 1-12, April.
    2. Laura Abrardi & Laura Rondi, 2020. "Ownership and performance in the Italian stock exchange: the puzzle of family firms," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 47(4), pages 613-643, December.
    3. Duqi, Andi & Jaafar, Aziz & Warsame, Mohammed H., 2020. "Payout policy and ownership structure: The case of Islamic and conventional banks," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1).
    4. Fernau, Erik & Hirsch, Stefan, 2019. "What drives dividend smoothing? A meta regression analysis of the Lintner model," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 255-273.
    5. Muhammad Nadeem Khan & Moona Shamim, 2017. "A Sectoral Analysis of Dividend Payment Behavior," SAGE Open, , vol. 7(1), pages 21582440166, January.
    6. Salvador Bertomeu & Antonio Estache, 2019. "Should Infrastructure Regulators regulate Dividends? Hints from a Literature Survey," Working Papers ECARES 2019-18, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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