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Parties, Politics, And Regulation: Evidence From Clean Air Act Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Robert Innes
  • Arnab Mitra

Abstract

Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election. (JEL D73, Q52, Q53)

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Innes & Arnab Mitra, 2015. "Parties, Politics, And Regulation: Evidence From Clean Air Act Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 53(1), pages 522-539, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:53:y:2015:i:1:p:522-539
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12142
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    Cited by:

    1. Choy, Stacey & Jiang, Shushu & Liao, Scott & Wang, Emma, 2024. "Public environmental enforcement and private lender monitoring: Evidence from environmental covenants," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2).
    2. Suvrat Dhanorkar & Suresh Muthulingam, 2020. "Do E‐Waste Laws Create Behavioral Spillovers? Quasi‐Experimental Evidence from California," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1738-1766, July.
    3. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    4. Jonathan Colmer & Mary F. Evans & Jay Shimshack, 2023. "Environmental citizen complaints," CEP Discussion Papers dp1903, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    5. Beland, Louis-Philippe & Boucher, Vincent, 2015. "Polluting politics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 176-181.
    6. Jung Taek Han & Seo Yeon Kim, 2019. "Debunking myths about oil: A case study of oil subsidies," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 22(2), pages 186-200, June.
    7. Bonnet, Paolo & Olper, Alessandro, 2024. "Party affiliation, economic interests and U.S. governors’ renewable energy policies," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    8. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang, 2020. "The politics of environmental enforcement: the case of the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(6), pages 2593-2613, June.
    9. Mary F. Evans & Scott M. Gilpatric & Jay P. Shimshack, 2018. "Enforcement Spillovers: Lessons from Strategic Interactions in Regulation and Product Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(4), pages 739-769.
    10. Neal D. Woods, 2022. "Regulatory competition, administrative discretion, and environmental policy implementation," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 39(4), pages 486-511, July.
    11. Aaron A. Elrod & Serkan Karadas & Katherine C. Theyson, 2019. "The effect of gubernatorial political parties on monitoring and enforcement of federal environmental regulation: evidence from the Clean Water Act," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(2), pages 171-202, April.
    12. Caroline Cecot, 2021. "The Federal Enforcement Threat: The Effect of Overfiling Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(3), pages 534-568, September.
    13. Cahan, Dodge, 2019. "Electoral cycles in government employment: Evidence from US gubernatorial elections," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 122-138.
    14. Raff, Zach & Meyer, Andrew & Walter, Jason M., 2022. "Political differences in air pollution abatement under the Clean Air Act," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    15. Jodi L. Short, 2021. "The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance: Theorizing and operationalizing political influences," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 653-685, July.
    16. Dahlvik Julia & Pohn-Weidinger Axel & Kollegger Martina, 2020. "Independence despite Political Appointment ? The Curious Case of the Austrian Ombudsman Board," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 13(2), pages 181-210, December.
    17. Min-Uk Kim & Kyong Whan Moon & Jong-Ryeul Sohn & Sang-Hoon Byeon, 2018. "Sensitivity Analysis of Weather Variables on Offsite Consequence Analysis Tools in South Korea and the United States," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-13, May.
    18. Karakas, Leyla D. & Mitra, Devashish, 2020. "Believers vs. deniers: Climate change and environmental policy polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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