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An Economic Theory Of Workaholics And Alcoholics

Author

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  • AARON FINKLE
  • DONGSOO SHIN

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> This paper considers the role of alcohol in agency problems in order to provide an economic rationale for alcoholics and workaholics. In our model, alcohol reduces productivity, but also can make imbibers blurt private information. We show that in the optimal contract, low-productivity workers are compelled to over-indulge in alcohol, while high-productivity workers overproduce output. Thus, workers are made into “alcoholics” and “workaholics” depending on their productivity. We conclude that excessive drinking (working) may be the result, not the cause, of low (high) productivity of workers. (JEL D82, VSOP)

Suggested Citation

  • Aaron Finkle & Dongsoo Shin, 2014. "An Economic Theory Of Workaholics And Alcoholics," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 896-899, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:52:y:2014:i:2:p:896-899
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecin.12049
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jie Dong & Qiran Zhao & Yanjun Ren, 2022. "Dark Side or Bright Side: The Impact of Alcohol Drinking on the Trust of Chinese Rural Residents," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(10), pages 1-15, May.
    2. Au, Pak Hung & Lim, Wooyoung & Zhang, Jipeng, 2022. "In vino veritas? Communication under the influence—An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 325-340.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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