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Collection Sales: Good Or Bad For Journals?

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  • MARK ARMSTRONG

Abstract

This article discusses the impact of collection sales (i.e., the bundling of several journals for sale by publishers to libraries) on journals. The advent of electronic journal distribution implies that bundling is an efficient sales strategy and can act to extend the reach of a journal. Current arrangements are discussed and shown to lead to tensions between commercial publishers and nonprofit journals. The article argues that nonprofit journals should not necessarily abandon collection sales programs. Rather, nonprofit journals may benefit from withdrawing from commercial publishers which distribute their own for‐profit journals, and joining together to be distributed by less commercial publishers who set relatively low prices for their collections. (JEL D82, L31, L42, L82)

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Armstrong, 2010. "Collection Sales: Good Or Bad For Journals?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 163-176, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:48:y:2010:i:1:p:163-176
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00207.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Victor Ginsburgh & Israel Zang, 2007. "Bundling by Competitors and the Sharing of Profits," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(16), pages 1-9.
    2. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2001. "Free Labour for Costly Journals?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 183-198, Fall.
    3. Mark Armstrong, 2006. "Competition in two‐sided markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, September.
    4. Mathias Dewatripont & Victor Ginsburgh & Patrick Legros & Alexis Walckiers, 2007. "Pricing of Scientific Journals and Market Power," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 400-410, 04-05.
    5. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2006. "Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition among Publishers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(5), pages 1038-1083, September.
    6. Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1999. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(12), pages 1613-1630, December.
    8. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 2000. "Bundling and Competition on the Internet," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(1), pages 63-82, May.
    9. Mark Armstrong, 1999. "Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 151-168.
    10. McCabe Mark J & Snyder Christopher M., 2007. "Academic Journal Prices in a Digital Age: A Two-Sided Market Model," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39, January.
    11. Aviv Nevo & Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Mark McCabe, 2005. "Academic Journal Pricing and the Demand of Libraries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 447-452, May.
    12. Edlin, Aaron S. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2004. "Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The "Big Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9hc6n6ds, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    13. Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2005. "Open Access and Academic Journal Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 453-459, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2017. "The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 105-135, March.
    2. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2010. "The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 222-255, May.
    3. Matteo Migheli & Giovanni B. Ramello, 2014. "Open Access Journals & Academics’ Behaviour," ICER Working Papers 03-2014, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    4. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2018. "The determinants of product lines," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(3), pages 541-573, September.
    5. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
    6. Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2013. "When Is Building a Library Consortium Beneficial?," IDEI Working Papers 791, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 07 Apr 2014.
    7. Ryoko Oki, 2015. "Fixed-fee Pricing and Entry," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 233-240.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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