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Do International Monetary Fund Programs Impact On The Sacrifice Ratio?

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  • Winston R. MOORE

Abstract

From time to time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) makes resources available to member states for short‐term balance‐of‐payments support under an agreed arrangement know as a program. Most IMF programs include quantitative performance criteria for key macroeconomic variables, which borrowers must meet to obtain Fund resources. Standard open economy models predict that if policymakers are able to credibly commit to reducing inflation, rational economic agents will lower their expectations of inflation and, therefore, the trade‐off between inflation and output will fall. The present study tests whether IMF programs, by lending credibility to a country's adjustment program, influence the inflation–output trade‐off. The results from the study suggest that IMF programs do not significantly influence the inflation–output trade‐off. This finding is robust to changes in the estimation approach, the method used to obtain the output gap estimates and outliers.

Suggested Citation

  • Winston R. MOORE, 2009. "Do International Monetary Fund Programs Impact On The Sacrifice Ratio?," The Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, vol. 47(2), pages 202-219, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:deveco:v:47:y:2009:i:2:p:202-219
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-1049.2009.00083.x
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