IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/corgov/v5y1997i4p206-213.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Emergence of Fiduciary Capitalism

Author

Listed:
  • James Hawley
  • Andrew Williams

Abstract

The twentieth century has seen a sea change in the concentration of ownership of U.S. corporations. Early in the century Berle and Means identified the divorce of ownership from control as the central corporate governance problem, but since the 1970’s ownership has been re’rating into the hands of fiduciary institutions – most notably pension funds and mutual funds. By the 1990s fiduciaries collectively owned over 50% of the outstanding equity of the 1,000 largest corporations. This new pattern of ownership, fiduciary capitalism, has begun to raise important policy questions including: How can agents (fiduciaries) effectively monitor other agents (boards of directors)? What are the social implications of universal ownership where fiduciaries own substantial stakes in virtually all of the corporations in a country, and, finally, What does it mean to maximize shareholder wealth when fiduciaries are universal owners?

Suggested Citation

  • James Hawley & Andrew Williams, 1997. "The Emergence of Fiduciary Capitalism," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(4), pages 206-213, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:5:y:1997:i:4:p:206-213
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00062
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00062
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1467-8683.00062?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Estapé-Dubreuil, Glòria & Ashta, Arvind & Hédou, Jean-Pierre, 2016. "Micro-equity for sustainable development: Selection, monitoring and exit strategies of micro-angels," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 117-129.
    2. How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter & Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi, 2014. "Institutional investors, political connections and analyst following in Malaysia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 158-167.
    3. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "Incremental cash flows, information sets and conflicts of interest," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 220, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Rodolfo Apreda, 2002. "How corporate governance and globalization can run afoul of the law and good practices in business: The Enron's disgraceful affair," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 225, Universidad del CEMA.
    5. Noura Ben M’Barek, 2008. "L’hétérogénéité du comportement de contrôle des investisseurs institutionnels français," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 91(1), pages 231-254.
    6. Marc Goergen & Christine A. Mallin & Eve Mitleton-Kelly & Ahmed Al-Hawamdeh & Iris H-Y Chiu, 2010. "Corporate Governance and Complexity Theory," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13927.
    7. Martin Gold, 2010. "Fiduciary Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13813.
    8. Parfitt, Claire, 2024. "A foundation for ‘ethical capital’: The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board and Integrated Reporting," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    9. Adegbite, Emmanuel, 2015. "Good corporate governance in Nigeria: Antecedents, propositions and peculiarities," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-330.
    10. Lim, Mable & How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter, 2014. "Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings: Malaysian evidence," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 32-45.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:5:y:1997:i:4:p:206-213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.