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Direct and Ultimate Ownership Structures in the UK: an intertemporal perspective over the last decade

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  • Maria‐Teresa Marchica
  • Roberto Mura

Abstract

In this paper we analyse the evolution of the direct and ultimate ownership structure of a large sample of UK non‐financial listed firms over the last decade. Our data show that while outsider ownership is relatively stable over time, managerial ownership shows a sharp decreasing trend and it is significantly lower in the presence of a large outside controller. Nonetheless, while average shareholding by executives confirms the decreasing trend, the opposite holds for non‐executive directors. In addition, while average board size is rather constant in time, the proportion of non‐executives is steadily increasing in time. As far as ultimate ownership is concerned, our data show that the existence of complex ownership structures in the UK is far from being negligible. We document that more than 10 per cent of the firms are owned via a complex structure and the degree of divergence between cash flow and control rights for these firms is around 11 per cent at the 10 per cent cut‐off. Our data also suggest that the presence of complex structures is decreasing in time at any cut‐off level. In addition, we report a decreasing trend over time of “widely held” firms. Finally, we show preliminary evidence of a negative impact of the divergence between cash flow and control rights on firm value.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria‐Teresa Marchica & Roberto Mura, 2005. "Direct and Ultimate Ownership Structures in the UK: an intertemporal perspective over the last decade," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 26-45, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:13:y:2005:i:1:p:26-45
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00401.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Conyon, Martin J & Leech, Dennis, 1994. "Top Pay, Company Performance and Corporate Governance," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 56(3), pages 229-247, August.
    4. Crespi, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2003. "Corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK," Other publications TiSEM f7b7fa79-dcc7-4499-8281-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Colin Mayer & Julian Franks & Stefano Rossi, 2002. "The Origination and Evolution of Ownership and Control," Economics Series Working Papers 2003-FE-01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Aluchna & Tomasz Kuszewski, 2021. "Pyramidal Ownership and Company Value: Evidence from Polish Listed Companies," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 15(4), December.
    2. Kuan, Tsung-Han & Li, Chu-Shiu & Liu, Chwen-Chi, 2012. "Corporate governance and cash holdings: A quantile regression approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 303-314.
    3. Aguilera, Ruth V. & Crespi-Cladera, Rafel, 2016. "Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms’ ownership structure," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 50-57.
    4. Roberto Mura, 2007. "Firm Performance: Do Non‐Executive Directors Have Minds of their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 36(3), pages 81-112, September.
    5. Maria-Teresa Marchica, "undated". "Debt Maturity and the Characteristics of Ownership Structure: An Empirical Investigation of UK Firms," Discussion Papers 05/29, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Wang, Fangjun & Wang, Xuanzi & Li, Boying & Liu, Yang S., 2023. "Ownership structure and eco-innovation: Evidence from Chinese family firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

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