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Does Culture Affect Electoral Outcomes? Evidence From Transition Countries

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  • Danko Tarabar
  • Javier E. Portillo

Abstract

Why do some societies fail to adopt “good” economic institutions? Recent literature points to the role of complementarities between social norms and proposed formal rules in advancing institutional change. To shed light on one potential mechanism, we track election performance of executive parties in up to 18 post‐communist democracies over 1991–2015 to test whether cultural attitudes influenced voters' response to market reform. We show that in more individualistic cultures, reform is associated with greater reward for the incumbent in the next election. The implication is that in democracies, voters select policies and institutions that are in line with prevailing culture. (JEL O17, P35, Z1)

Suggested Citation

  • Danko Tarabar & Javier E. Portillo, 2021. "Does Culture Affect Electoral Outcomes? Evidence From Transition Countries," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 141-155, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:39:y:2021:i:1:p:141-155
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12489
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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