IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/coecpo/v26y2008i4p607-622.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

WHAT DETERMINES THE “LEGAL” QUALITY Of BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION?

Author

Listed:
  • NERGIZ DINCER
  • BILIN NEYAPTI

Abstract

This article has two contributions. First, using the methodology of Neyapti and Dincer, it provides measures of legal quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) for a new set of developed and less‐developed countries. Second, it investigates the determinants of RS in view of the hypothesis that the existing institutional environment matters for the quality of formal institutions such as banking laws. The empirical evidence in this article demonstrates that past financial crises and prevailing levels of both financial market development and foreign direct investment inflows affect RS beyond and above the effects of other potential factors, such as macroeconomic performance and good governance. Evidence from transition economies also supports these findings. (JEL E44, G2, K29, O1)

Suggested Citation

  • Nergiz Dincer & Bilin Neyapti, 2008. "WHAT DETERMINES THE “LEGAL” QUALITY Of BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 607-622, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:26:y:2008:i:4:p:607-622
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2008.00117.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2008.00117.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1465-7287.2008.00117.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bilin Neyapti & Nergiz Dincer, 2005. "Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision with an Application to Transition Economies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(1), pages 79-99, January.
    2. Demirgüç-Kunt, AslI & Detragiache, Enrica & Tressel, Thierry, 2008. "Banking on the principles: Compliance with Basel Core Principles and bank soundness," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 511-542, October.
    3. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 205-248, April.
    4. Richard Podpiera, 2006. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(2), pages 1-5.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March.
    6. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2002. "Governance matters II - updated indicators for 2000-01," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2772, The World Bank.
    7. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis, 2009. "On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy," MPRA Paper 16836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2013. "The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4584-4598.
    3. Bilin Neyapti, 2018. "Income distribution and economic crises," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 273-296, December.
    4. Cristina Pereira Pedro & Joaquim J. S. Ramalho & Jacinto Vidigal Silva, 2018. "The main determinants of banking crises in OECD countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 154(1), pages 203-227, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bilin Neyapti, 2010. "Macroeconomic Institutions and Development," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12960.
    2. Agoraki, Maria-Eleni K. & Delis, Manthos D. & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2011. "Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 38-48, January.
    3. Hans Degryse & Sanja Jakovljević & Steven Ongena, 2015. "A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 423-443, December.
    4. Bourgain, Arnaud & Pieretti, Patrice & Zanaj, Skerdilajda, 2012. "Financial openness, disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 283-300.
    5. Marchionne, Francesco & Pisicoli, Beniamino & Fratianni, Michele, 2022. "Regulation and crises: A concave story," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    6. Mohammad Bitar & Sami Ben Naceur & Rym Ayadi & Thomas Walker, 2021. "Basel Compliance and Financial Stability: Evidence from Islamic Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 81-134, August.
    7. Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2011. "Basel Core Principles and bank soundness: Does compliance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 179-190, December.
    8. Shehzad, Choudhry Tanveer & de Haan, Jakob & Scholtens, Bert, 2010. "The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 399-408, February.
    9. Marchionne, Francesco & Pisicoli, Beniamino & Fratianni, Michele, 2022. "Regulation, financial crises, and liberalization traps," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    10. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ms. Enrica Detragiache, 2010. "Basel Core Principles and Bank Risk: Does Compliance Matter?," IMF Working Papers 2010/081, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Elfers, Ferdinand & Koenraadt, Jeroen, 2022. "What you don’t know won’t hurt you: Market monitoring and bank supervisors’ preference for private information," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    12. Klomp, Jeroen & Haan, Jakob de, 2012. "Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3197-3212.
    13. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 2006. "Finance and economic development : policy choices for developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3955, The World Bank.
    14. Ayadi, Rym & Naceur, Sami Ben & Casu, Barbara & Quinn, Barry, 2016. "Does Basel compliance matter for bank performance?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 15-32.
    15. Cubillas, Elena & González, Francisco, 2014. "Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 11(C), pages 32-48.
    16. Karakoyun, Oğuz Kaan & Karakaplan, Mustafa U. & Neyaptı, Bilin, 2024. "Endogenous bank regulation and supervision: Long term implications," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    17. Gastón Andrés Giordana & Ingmar Schumacher, 2017. "An Empirical Study on the Impact of Basel III Standards on Banks’ Default Risk: The Case of Luxembourg," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-21, April.
    18. Kilinc, Mustafa & Neyapti, Bilin, 2012. "Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 132-141.
    19. Masciandaro, Donato & Pansini, Rosaria Vega & Quintyn, Marc, 2013. "The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 578-596.
    20. Boulanouar, Zakaria & Alqahtani, Faisal & Hamdi, Besma, 2021. "Bank ownership, institutional quality and financial stability: evidence from the GCC region," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • K29 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Other
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:26:y:2008:i:4:p:607-622. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.