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Democracy And Economic Reform: Theory And Some Evidence From The Russian Case

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  • SERGUEY BRAGUINSKY

Abstract

The paper examines theoretical issues concerning the relationship between political democracy and economic reform and builds on the empirical material from the recent experience of Russia. The process of transition to democracy is shown to have started spontaneously due to the situation of power stalemate among pressure groups that came to control the communist system in the years preceding its ultimate collapse. The unrestrained control by those groups is shown to be the reason behind the continued economic collapse, while gradual build‐up of the democratic system can in the long run act in the direction of improving the chances for a successful economic reform.

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  • Serguey Braguinsky, 1998. "Democracy And Economic Reform: Theory And Some Evidence From The Russian Case," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 16(2), pages 227-240, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:16:y:1998:i:2:p:227-240
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00514.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00514.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1995. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 856-866, December.
    2. Remmer, Karen L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 1980–1991," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 393-407, June.
    3. Baron, David P., 1994. "Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(1), pages 33-47, March.
    4. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    5. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    6. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521467681 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    8. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521462068 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Serguey Braguinsky, 1996. "Corruption And Schumpeterian Growth In Different Economic Environments," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 14-25, July.
    10. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Marangos, 2002. "A post Keynesian critique of privatization policies in transition economies," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(5), pages 573-589.

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