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Effects On Interest Rates Of Immediately Releasing Fomc Directives

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  • MICHAEL T. BELONGIA
  • KEVIN L. KLIESEN

Abstract

Prior to February 1994, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) did not officially release its current Domestic Policy Directives to the public until after the next FOMC meeting, a lag of approximately 45 days. Thus, the public never knew the FOMC's latest decisions about short‐run monetary policy. On 11 occasions between early 1989 and May 1993, however, the essence of the directives was “leaked” to the Wall Street Journal within one week of an FOMC meeting. This study tests Federal Reserve officials' original assertion that early release of directives would increase volatility in financial markets by creating announcement effects. The study finds some evidence of announcement effects in certain instances, but the assertion that an immediate release would “roil the markets” appears unfounded.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael T. Belongia & Kevin L. Kliesen, 1994. "Effects On Interest Rates Of Immediately Releasing Fomc Directives," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 12(4), pages 79-91, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:12:y:1994:i:4:p:79-91
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1994.tb00447.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reinhart, Vincent & Simin, Timothy, 1997. "The market reaction to federal reserve policy action from 1989 to 1992," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 149-168.
    2. Thomas Urich & Paul Wachtel, 2001. "Financial Market Responses To Monetary Policy Changes In The 1990s," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(3), pages 254-267, July.
    3. Anna Cieslak & Adair Morse & Annette Vissing‐Jorgensen, 2019. "Stock Returns over the FOMC Cycle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(5), pages 2201-2248, October.
    4. Daniel L. Thornton, 1996. "Does the Fed's new policy of immediate disclosure affect the market?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 77-88.
    5. Antulio N. Bomfim & Vincent Reinhart, 2000. "Making news: financial market effects of Federal Reserve disclosure practices," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2000-14, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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