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Gouvernances Publiques Et Entreprises Publiques Dans Les Economies De Rente

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  • Malika AHMED ZAID-CHERTOUK
  • Philippe BANCE

Abstract

In a rent-based economy, the economic reforms, in the political context in which they are implemented, remain purely formal and are incapable to allow the national and international investment to display. They do not allow countries concerned to go out of the social order based on the field of the rent and the low opening of the politico-economic system to the competition. Without perspectives of sustainable economic growth and of job creation others than State-subsidized, this system closed in the competition carries in itself the germs of its overtaking: he cannot answer durably the social demand of change and cannot face the increasing difficulties of financing of the social stability. In this context, our contribution suggests studying public enterprises evolving in a rent-based economy and to identify mechanisms allowing the resources of the rent at best of the general interest. Then, the analysis treats how to rethink the national general interest in a rent-based economy for a better consideration of the needs of sustainable development. How to reformulate the missions assigned to public enterprises to allow them to insource at best this general interest? What new modes of governance to implement to contribute to the realization of these objectives?

Suggested Citation

  • Malika AHMED ZAID-CHERTOUK & Philippe BANCE, 2015. "Gouvernances Publiques Et Entreprises Publiques Dans Les Economies De Rente," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 86(4), pages 657-681, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:86:y:2015:i:4:p:657-681
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    References listed on IDEAS

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