Author
Abstract
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is a significant component of the global governance structure and considered a gold standard international body with 193 member states and scientific divisions expected to adhere rigorously to objectivity and political neutrality. However, OPCW's reputation has recently been tarnished. Dissenting scientists from within the organization have raised serious questions about the integrity of an OPCW fact‐finding mission (FFM) investigating the alleged chemical attack in Douma, Syria on April 7, 2018. The OPCW FFMs are tainted in three ways: (1) they rely upon information provided via intermediaries connected to states that are belligerents in the war in Syria; (2) the organizational structure of an FFM excludes scientific and verification divisions of the OPCW; and (3) control of FFMs is held by a bureaucratic office staffed by career diplomats who are from states involved with the Syrian war. Furthermore, officials involved with the Douma FFM investigation report the following anomalies: (a) an original interim report was secretly altered in order to make an unsubstantiated suggestion that an alleged attack had occurred; (b) A U.S. delegation was allowed to brief the FFM, an action prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention; and (c) formal attempts by the inspectors to obtain transparency and dialog was rejected by the OPCW. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have dismissed questions as Russian “disinformation” or as a “conspiracy theory.” Overall, analysis of the alleged Douma attack and the OPCW's FFM supports the thesis that key international organizations have been effectively captured, or at the very least heavily influenced, by particular states that assume their own impartiality. This shortcoming poses a risk to international peace and security.
Suggested Citation
Piers Robinson, 2023.
"The corrupt politics of chemical weapons,"
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(5), pages 481-492, November.
Handle:
RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:82:y:2023:i:5:p:481-492
DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12530
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