IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ajecsc/v48y1989i3p339-349.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interest Groups, Transfer Seeking and Democratization: Competition for the Benefits of Governmental Power May Explain African Political Instability

Author

Listed:
  • Mwangi S. Kimenyi

Abstract

. The effect of permanent interest group transfer‐seeking behavior on the degree of democratization is examined, Each permanent interest group is viewed as attempting to maximize its share of wealth transfers through the political process. To maximize the share of transfers, each group undertakes competitive strategies to control the instruments of transfers. Such competition is more intense the larger the number of permanent interest groups in a given country, and the higher the likelihood that the competition would involve non‐democratic means to achieve and maintain control of the political machinery in those countries. It is predicted that the more intense the competition for transfers, which is a direct function of the number of permanent interest groups in any given country, the less democratic the system of government in that country is likely to be. This prediction is supported empirically using cross‐sectional data for 65 countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 1989. "Interest Groups, Transfer Seeking and Democratization: Competition for the Benefits of Governmental Power May Explain African Political Instability," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 339-349, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:48:y:1989:i:3:p:339-349
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1989.tb03186.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1989.tb03186.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1989.tb03186.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wayne Brough & Mwangi Kimenyi, 1986. "On the inefficient extraction of rents by dictators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 37-48, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2006. "Ethnicity, Governance and the Provision of Public Goods," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 15(1), pages 62-99, April.
    2. Kimenyi, Mwangi S. & Mbaku, John Mukum, 1996. "Rents, military elites, and political democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 699-708, April.
    3. Alexander Galetovic & Ricardo Sanhueza, 1996. "Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'État," Documentos de Trabajo 11, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2006. "The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya," Working papers 2006-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Polachek Solomon W., 1999. "Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-32, April.
    2. Székely-Doby, András, 2016. "Járadékteremtés és az áldemokráciák [Rent creation and pseudo-democracies]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 501-523.
    3. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2007. "Institutional Infrastructure to Support 'Super Growth' in Kenya: Governance Thresholds, Reversion Rates and Economic Development," Working papers 2007-32, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Alexander Galetovic & Ricardo Sanhueza, 1996. "Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups D'État," Documentos de Trabajo 11, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    5. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, 1993. "Doing Well While Intending Good: Cases in Political Exploitation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 317-348, July.
    6. Antonis Adam & Sofia Tsarsitalidou, 2018. "Do democracies have higher current account deficits?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 40-68, March.
    7. Gary Anderson, 1988. "Public finance in autocratic process: An empirical note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 25-37, April.
    8. Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2005. "Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions," Working papers 2005-40, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:48:y:1989:i:3:p:339-349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0002-9246 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.