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Accounting irregularities, management compensation structure and information asymmetry

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Listed:
  • Fayez A. Elayan
  • Jingyu Li
  • Thomas O. Meyer

Abstract

The discovery of accounting irregularities is an important negative event for a company. The restatement resulting from the irregularity represents an average of 364 per cent of net income for the 152‐firm sample and the irregularities are predominantly revenue enhancing. The irregularity firms exhibit both lower transparency and visibility compared to a matched sample of non‐irregularity firms. Furthermore, prior to the announcement, these firms experienced poorer operating performance and their executive compensation structure is found to be significantly more equity‐based. Therefore, firms that have greater opportunity and incentive are shown to be more likely to commit accounting irregularities.

Suggested Citation

  • Fayez A. Elayan & Jingyu Li & Thomas O. Meyer, 2008. "Accounting irregularities, management compensation structure and information asymmetry," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 48(5), pages 741-760, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:48:y:2008:i:5:p:741-760
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2008.00266.x
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    2. Pavlopoulos, Athanasios & Magnis, Chris & Iatridis, George Emmanuel, 2017. "Integrated reporting: Is it the last piece of the accounting disclosure puzzle?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 23-46.
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    6. Nguyen Vinh Khuong & Nguyen Tran Thai Ha & Phung Anh Thu, 2019. "The Relationship between Real Earnings Management and Firm Performance: The Case of Energy Firms in Vietnam," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 9(2), pages 307-314.
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