IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/abacus/v57y2021i2p297-324.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Executive Compensation and Company Valuation

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Schueler

Abstract

In the literature, the integration of the cash and risk effects of executive compensation into company valuation is discussed only marginally. This paper addresses the question of how these effects can be integrated into corporate valuation. Several methods for solving the problem are discussed and a method free of circular references, similar to the adjusted present value approach to company valuation, is identified. Contrary to a common assumption in the literature, there is no uniform and constant cost of capital for a company that uses employee stock options. Cost of capital needs to be adjusted to the cash and risk impact of equity‐based executive compensation. Making recourse to the treasury stock method, which is used to calculate diluted earnings per share, is not recommended here even though a corrected version of this method is used. I discuss different forms of equity‐based executive compensation, including the resulting allocation of risk and net present value between owners and managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Schueler, 2021. "Executive Compensation and Company Valuation," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 57(2), pages 297-324, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:57:y:2021:i:2:p:297-324
    DOI: 10.1111/abac.12199
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12199
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/abac.12199?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian Bratten & Ross Jennings & Casey M. Schwab, 2015. "The Effect of Using a Lattice Model to Estimate Reported Option Values," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(1), pages 193-222, March.
    2. Feng Li & M. H. Franco Wong, 2005. "Employee Stock Options, Equity Valuation, and the Valuation of Option Grants Using a Warrant‐Pricing Model," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 97-131, March.
    3. Bogue, Marcus C & Roll, Richard, 1974. "Capital Budgeting of Risky Projects with "Imperfect" Markets for Physical Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 601-613, May.
    4. G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), 2013. "Handbook of the Economics of Finance," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier, volume 2, number 2-b.
    5. James H. Irving & Wayne R. Landsman & Bradley P. Lindsey, 2011. "The Valuation Differences Between Stock Option and Restricted Stock Grants for US Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3-4), pages 395-412, April.
    6. G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), 2013. "Handbook of the Economics of Finance," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Elsevier, volume 2, number 2-a.
    7. Murphy, Kevin J., 2013. "Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 211-356, Elsevier.
    8. Isik Inselbag & Howard Kaufold, 1997. "Two Dcf Approaches For Valuing Companies Under Alternative Financing Strategies (And How To Choose Between Them)," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 10(1), pages 114-122, March.
    9. Tim Leung & Ronnie Sircar, 2009. "Accounting For Risk Aversion, Vesting, Job Termination Risk And Multiple Exercises In Valuation Of Employee Stock Options," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 99-128, January.
    10. Schall, Lawrence D, 1972. "Asset Valuation, Firm Investment, and Firm Diversification," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 11-28, January.
    11. Jouahn Nam & Richard E. Ottoo & John H. Thornton Jr., 2003. "The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-101, February.
    12. Martin Widdicks & Jinsha Zhao, 2014. "A Model of Equity Based Compensation with Tax," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(7-8), pages 1002-1041, September.
    13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
    14. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
    15. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411-411.
    16. Phillip R. Daves & Michael C. Ehrhardt, 2007. "Convertible Securities, Employee Stock Options and the Cost of Equity," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 42(2), pages 267-288, May.
    17. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    18. Cox, John C. & Ross, Stephen A. & Rubinstein, Mark, 1979. "Option pricing: A simplified approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 229-263, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andreas Schüler, 2018. "Aktienbasierte erfolgsabhängige Entlohnung & Unternehmensbewertung [Share Based Compensation & Valuation]," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 125-151, March.
    2. Daniel Beck & Gunther Friedl & Peter Schäfer, 2020. "Executive compensation in Germany," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 90(5), pages 787-824, June.
    3. Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, 2013. "Say on pay laws, executive compensation, CEO pay slice, and firm value around the world," International Finance Discussion Papers 1084, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Correa, Ricardo & Lel, Ugur, 2016. "Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 500-520.
    5. James Borthwick & Aelee Jun & Shiguang Ma, 2020. "Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy of Australian Say‐on‐Pay," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 827-876, April.
    6. Dragan Ilić & Sonja Pisarov & Peter S. Schmidt, 2019. "Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-25, December.
    7. Anne Amar-Sabbah & Pierre Batteau, 2018. "CEO Compensation: Agency Theory is Irrelevant but not the Neoclassical Game-Theoretic Framework," Working Papers halshs-01818600, HAL.
    8. Schmid, Stefan & Altfeld, Frederic & Dauth, Tobias, 2018. "Americanization as a driver of CEO pay in Europe: The moderating role of CEO power," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 433-451.
    9. Harashima, Taiji, 2019. "Why Is Executive Compensation So High? A Model of Executive Compensation," MPRA Paper 91326, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Dev R. Mishra, 2021. "Charitable inclination and the chief executive officer's pay package," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 85-108, February.
    11. Ann-Christine Schulz & Miriam Flickinger, 2020. "Does CEO (over)compensation influence corporate reputation?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 903-927, August.
    12. Duong, Lien & Evans, John, 2015. "CFO compensation: Evidence from Australia," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 425-443.
    13. Vo, Thi Thanh Nha & Canil, Jean Milva, 2019. "CEO pay disparity: Efficient contracting or managerial power?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 168-190.
    14. Grey, Colette & Flynn, Antoinette & Donnelly, Ray, 2020. "Management compensation contracts and distribution policies in the US technology sector," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    15. Merz, Alexander, 2017. "What have we learned from SFAS 123r and IFRS 2? A review of existing evidence and future research suggestions," Journal of Accounting Literature, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 14-33.
    16. Tor‐Erik Bakke & Hamed Mahmudi & Ashley Newton, 2020. "Performance peer groups in CEO compensation contracts," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 997-1027, December.
    17. Na, Ke, 2020. "CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 679-700.
    18. Ahmed, Shaker & Ranta, Mikko & Vähämaa, Emilia & Vähämaa, Sami, 2023. "Facial attractiveness and CEO compensation: Evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    19. Dögüs, Ilhan, 2017. "Rising wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers and market concentration: The case of the USA, 1966-2011," ZÖSS-Discussion Papers 62, University of Hamburg, Centre for Economic and Sociological Studies (CESS/ZÖSS).
    20. Sessions, John G. & Skåtun, John D., 2015. "Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection," IZA Discussion Papers 8863, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:abacus:v:57:y:2021:i:2:p:297-324. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0001-3072 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.