The Role of the Legislative Structures in Military Coup Occurences in Africa (1960 – 2023)

Political scientists have identified economic hardship and prolonged presidential tenure as underlying causes of recent military coups in Africa but have overlooked the role of legislative structures. This study determines the role of legislative structures in military coup occurrences in Africa. Anchored on Karl Marx’s theory and elite theory, the study hypothesised that there is no significant difference in the number of coup occurrences per decade between African countries with unicameral and bicameral legislative structures. A longitudinal study that collected secondary data from various sources, such as the Coup Agency Mechanism data and Inter-Parliamentary Union, was done. Descriptive statistics and inferential statistics were performed. The study tested the hypothesis using an independent sample t-test, using coup occurrences per decade as the continuous variable and the legislative structure as the categorical variable. The results show that more military coups have occurred in African countries with unicameralism than in those with bicameralism. Findings from the trend analysis show that the lines for both categories increased and decreased at the same time, except in the last decade of the study, when the opposite occurred. The independent sample t-test result shows that there is no significant difference in the number of coup occurrences per decade between African countries with unicameral and bicameral legislative structures. This implies that the legislative structures have no role in the occurrences of coups. The study’s key recommendation is to focus on the actions of the legislatures, not their structure.