The Us Marshall Plan And The Post-World War Ii Reconstruction Of Europe, 1947-1970: Economic And Diplomatic Study

Purpose: This paper examines the immensity of the Marshall Plan in Europe in three subsections: the basis for its creation, its logistical implementation, and the fallouts on Europe as a whole and the United States of America. Methodology: The pitfalls of the Marshall Plan are further categorized into three rubrics: direct economic effects, indirect economic effects, and political effects. Results: Based on the theoretical and qualitativer methods, the paper argues that there is a dearth of evidence to show that direct economic outcomes accounted for the Marshall Plan's success. Rather, the indirect economic consequences, especially in the putting into place of liberal capitalistic policies, and the political effects, specifically the model of European integration and government-business partnerships, were the key vectors for Europe's unsurpassed growth in the aftermath of the Second World War. Unique contribution to theory and practice: Follow-on support, less complexity, inclusiveness of faith-based networks and economic aid packages that incorporate nuances of local culture and political economy, the paper suggests, will better off effectiveness of "fat elephant" recovery schemes to the scale of the Marshall Plan, for wars' squashed economies in need of a resurgence.