IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bfr/fisrev/20141818.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Macroprudential capital tools: assessing their rationale and effectiveness

Author

Listed:
  • Clerc, L.
  • Nikolov, K.
  • Derviz, A.
  • Stracca, L.
  • Mendicino, C.
  • Suarez, J.
  • Moyen, S.
  • Vardoulakis, A.

Abstract

In this paper, the authors analyse the rationale for and effectiveness of macroprudential capital tools. They first present the limits of the traditional approach to bank capital regulation and the reasons why developing a more holistic approach is deemed appropriate. They then assess the effectiveness of capital tools (namely capital requirements, countercyclical capital buffers and sectoral risk weights) from a macroprudential perspective in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model that features the default of the various classes of borrowers (banks, households and firms). Three main results stand out from this exercise: (i) there is generally an optimal level of capital requirements; (ii) the lower the banks’ capital ratio (or the higher their leverage), the greater the scope for amplification of real and financial shocks; (iii) a moderate degree of countercyclical adjustment of capital requirements may significantly improve the benefits of setting these requirements at a high level.

Suggested Citation

  • Clerc, L. & Nikolov, K. & Derviz, A. & Stracca, L. & Mendicino, C. & Suarez, J. & Moyen, S. & Vardoulakis, A., 2014. "Macroprudential capital tools: assessing their rationale and effectiveness," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 18, pages 183-194, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfr:fisrev:2014:18:18
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://publications.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/financial-stability-review-18_2014-04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clerc, L. & Gabrieli, S. & Kern, S. & El Omari, Y., 2014. "Monitoring the European CDS Market through Networks: Implications for Contagion Risks," Working papers 477, Banque de France.
    2. David Miles & Jing Yang & Gilberto Marcheggiano, 2013. "Optimal Bank Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(567), pages 1-37, March.
    3. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2013. "The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(2), pages 452-490.
    4. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2010. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_42, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. Laurent Clerc & Alexis Derviz & Caterina Mendicino & Stephane Moyen & Kalin Nikolov & Livio Stracca & Javier Suarez & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2015. "Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(3), pages 9-63, June.
    6. Gertler, Mark & Karadi, Peter, 2011. "A model of unconventional monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 17-34, January.
    7. Gertler, Mark & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Queralto, Albert, 2012. "Financial crises, bank risk exposure and government financial policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(S), pages 17-34.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Matteo Benetton, 2017. "Lenders' Competition and Macro-prudential Regulation: A Model of the UK Mortgage Supermarket," 2017 Meeting Papers 1001, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. repec:cnb:ocpubv:rb12/2 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:cnb:ocpubv:rb14/1 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin & Suarez, Javier & Supera, Dominik, 2020. "Bank capital in the short and in the long run," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 64-79.
    2. Caterina Mendicino & Kalin Nikolov & Javier Suarez & Dominik Supera, 2018. "Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(6), pages 1271-1297, September.
    3. Caterina Mendicino & Kalin Nikolov & Juan Rubio-Ramirez & Javier Suarez, 2020. "Twin Default Crises," Working Papers 2020-01, FEDEA.
    4. Matthieu Darracq Paries & Peter Karadi & Christoffer Kok & Kalin Nikolov, 2022. "The Impact of Capital Requirements on the Macroeconomy: Lessons from Four Macroeconomic Models of the Euro Area," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18(5), pages 1-50, December.
    5. Laurent Clerc & Alexis Derviz & Caterina Mendicino & Stephane Moyen & Kalin Nikolov & Livio Stracca & Javier Suarez & Alexandros P. Vardoulakis, 2015. "Capital Regulation in a Macroeconomic Model with Three Layers of Default," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(3), pages 9-63, June.
    6. Nelson, Benjamin & Pinter, Gabor, 2018. "Macroprudential capital regulation in general equilibrium," Bank of England working papers 770, Bank of England.
    7. José R. Maria & Paulo Júlio, 2018. "An integrated financial amplifier: the role of defaulted loans and occasionally binding constraints in output fluctuations," Working Papers w201813, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    8. Lubello, Federico & Petrella, Ivan & Santoro, Emiliano, 2019. "Bank assets, liquidity and credit cycles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 265-282.
    9. Mendicino, Caterina & Nikolov, Kalin & Ramirez, Juan-Rubio & Suarez, Javier & Supera, Dominik, 2020. "Twin defaults and bank capital requirements," Working Paper Series 2414, European Central Bank.
    10. Coimbra, Nuno, 2020. "Sovereigns at risk: A dynamic model of sovereign debt and banking leverage," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    11. Ogawa, Toshiaki, 2022. "Welfare implications of bank capital requirements under dynamic default decisions," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    12. Schroth, Josef, 2021. "Macroprudential policy with capital buffers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 296-311.
    13. Andrea Ferrero & Richard Harrison & Benjamin Nelson, 2024. "House Price Dynamics, Optimal LTV Limits and the Liquidity Trap," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(2), pages 940-971.
    14. Fève, Patrick & Sanchez, Pablo Garcia & Moura, Alban & Pierrard, Olivier, 2021. "Costly default and skewed business cycles," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    15. Clancy, Daragh & Merola, Rossana, 2017. "Countercyclical capital rules for small open economies," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PB), pages 332-351.
    16. Vadim Elenev & Tim Landvoigt & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021. "A Macroeconomic Model With Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1361-1418, May.
    17. Falter, Alexander, 2019. "Macro to the rescue? An analysis of macroprudential instruments to regulate housing credit," Discussion Papers 25/2019, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    18. Anton Korinek & Jonathan Kreamer, 2014. "The redistributive effects of financial deregulation: wall street versus main street," BIS Working Papers 468, Bank for International Settlements.
    19. Josef Schroth & Stephane Moyen, 2017. "Optimal Capital Regulation," 2017 Meeting Papers 828, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    20. Jochen O. Mierau & Mark Mink, 2018. "A Descriptive Model of Banking and Aggregate Demand," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(2), pages 207-237, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bfr:fisrev:2014:18:18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael brassart (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bdfgvfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.