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The Repeated Election of Established Politicians as a Key Factor in Nigeria’s Underdevelopment

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  • Tochukwu S. Ezeudu

    (Department of Public Administration Federal University Gusau, Nigeria)

  • Fadeyi Taofiq James

    (Department of Political Science, Federal University Gusau, Nigeria)

Abstract

This study delves into the recurring election of established politicians and its multifaceted implications for Nigeria’s development trajectory. Employing a mixed-methods approach, the research analyzes the effects of political incumbency on key development indicators, encompassing economic growth, infrastructure development, and governance efficiency. The study sheds light on the complex interplay between political dynamics and development outcomes through quantitative analysis, qualitative insights, and theoretical frameworks such as the Principal-Agent Theory. The findings reveal a nuanced relationship between political incumbency and development indicators. While some indicators exhibit positive growth, others demonstrate fluctuations or stagnation, echoing the trade-offs between short-term electoral gains and long-term development goals. Qualitative insights complement the quantitative results by highlighting concerns of limited accountability, reduced responsiveness, and stifled innovation associated with prolonged incumbency. Drawing on international experiences, the study offers comparative insights into the challenges and potential solutions. The discussion underscores the importance of striking a balance between electoral considerations and sustainable development objectives. The study recommends reforms such as term limits, electoral transparency, and support for emerging leadership to promote political diversity and informed decision-making. These recommendations can contribute to fostering an environment conducive to balanced and holistic development in Nigeria.

Suggested Citation

  • Tochukwu S. Ezeudu & Fadeyi Taofiq James, 2024. "The Repeated Election of Established Politicians as a Key Factor in Nigeria’s Underdevelopment," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 8(2), pages 324-340, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bcp:journl:v:8:y:2024:i:2:p:324-340
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