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Family taxation - pros and cons

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  • George Smatrakalev

Abstract

Implementing the family income taxation brings back the role of home economy in the civil society, gives new meaning of the marrage and household, helps abolition of some governnent sponsored social engineering. This article deals with some major moments in the prerequisites, place and role of the family income taxation. On the basis of comparative analysis the experience of some EU countries and USA in taxing the family are shown.

Suggested Citation

  • George Smatrakalev, 2003. "Family taxation - pros and cons," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 2, pages 109-117.
  • Handle: RePEc:bas:econth:y:2003:i:2:p:109-117
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alessandro Balestrino & Alessandro Cigno & Anna Pettini, 2002. "Endogenous Fertility and the Design of Family Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(2), pages 175-193, March.
    2. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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