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Distribution of Tax Burden in the Gas Sector in Europe

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  • Yuli Radev

Abstract

Traditionally the distribution of the tax burden among the consumers and manufacturers of whichever goods is analyzed using the Marshall’s partial equilibrium model of market. Because of the prevailing role of the long-term contracts in trading with natural gas, the use of only market model is not sufficient. A specific model based on the contracting process should be developed. In this model the spot markets remain a significant factor in the distribution of the tax burden, but mostly with their impact on ex post power of contracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuli Radev, 2013. "Distribution of Tax Burden in the Gas Sector in Europe," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 2, pages 109-130.
    • Handle: RePEc:bas:econst:y:2013:i:2:p:109-130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q33 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Resource Booms (Dutch Disease)
    • R22 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Other Demand

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