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Structure of the Corporate Control in the Enterprises from the Mass Privatization

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  • Vesselin Mintchev
  • Plamen Tchipev
  • Rosska Petkova

Abstract

The mass privatization exercised and is still exercising a serious and wide influence on the process of restructuring the national economy. One of the most serious directions of this influence is the forming of a new structure of forms of corporate control in the enterprises that have been privatized in this way. The whole variety of concrete forms of corporate control defines the structure of the corporate control in a certain country and exactly this newly emerging structure in the enterprises, privatized through the mass privatization, is presented in this study. Its objective is to analyze the actually emerging forms of corporate control as well as to determine the role and significance in this process of the scheme for mass privatization, the privatization funds with their strategies and capital market. The study defends the classical science tradition of Berle and Means that the exercising of an effective control over the corporation (resp. its managers) is determined by the scales and distribution of the shareholders’ participation in its capital. Based on this approach the study presents the conception of majority, resp. minority control, as well as the practical analysis made of the structure of shareholders’ participation in all 1040 enterprises from the first wave of the mass privatization. It studies consecutively the legal frame of the privatization, the role of the privatization funds and the capital market, and the concrete structure of the corporate control. The study concludes that the emerged structure of the corporate control in Bulgaria differs substantially from a control in a country with a well developed market economy such as Great Britain, and that the emerged concentrated forms of control do not contribute to the development of the stock market in Bulgaria.

Suggested Citation

  • Vesselin Mintchev & Plamen Tchipev & Rosska Petkova, 2000. "Structure of the Corporate Control in the Enterprises from the Mass Privatization," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 33-72.
  • Handle: RePEc:bas:econst:y:2000:i:1:p:33-72
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    2. Plamen D. Tchipev, 1998. "Bulgarian Mass Privatisation: Implications on Corporate Governance," ERI-BAS Chapters, in: Plamen D. Tchipev & Jurgen Backhaus & Frank Stephen (ed.), Mass privatisation schemes in Central and East European Countries. Implications on corporate governance, edition 1, chapter 2, pages 77-116, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute.
    3. Plamen D. Tchipev, 1998. "Bulgarian Mass Privatisation: Implications on Corporate Governance," ERI-BAS Chapters, in: Plamen D. Tchipev & Jurgen Backhaus & Frank Stephen (ed.), Mass privatisation schemes in Central and East European Countries. Implications on corporate governance, edition 1, chapter 2, pages 77-116 Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute.
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