IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bap/journl/180201.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does Individual Fund Shareholder Structure Matter? A Study of Exclusive Funds in Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Hsiu-lang Chen

    (Department of Finance, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan Street, Chicago, IL 60607, U.S.A.)

  • Rodrigo F. Malaquias

    (Department of Finance, School of Business and Management, Federal University of Uberlandia Av., Jo?o Naves de ¨¢vila, no 2121, Room 1F-200, Uberlandia, MG 38400-902, BRAZIL)

Abstract

This study investigates the role of fund shareholder structure on the agency conflicts in delegated investment management. An exclusive fund is designed to receive investments from one investor only and it is unique in Brazil. Specifically, we examine equity fund managers who manage both exclusive mutual funds and traditional mutual funds in Brazil. We find that the 4-factor alpha of exclusive funds from a manager who manages both exclusive and traditional funds is higher than that of the manager¡¯s traditional funds. Furthermore, we show that a fund manager has a greater incentive to improve his/her exclusive funds instead of traditional funds when both suffer poor performance. The behavior of prioritizing shareholders of exclusive funds is particularly strong during a period when the market volatility is high.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsiu-lang Chen & Rodrigo F. Malaquias, 2018. "Does Individual Fund Shareholder Structure Matter? A Study of Exclusive Funds in Brazil," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 12, pages 1-15, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bap:journl:180201
    Note: Chen gratefully acknowledges the support from the Dean¡¯s Summer Research Grant Program at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Malaquias thanks FAPEMIG for the support in developing the database for this study (APQ-01265-14), and Prof. William Eid Jr. for his comments on characteristics of Exclusive Funds in Brazil. All errors remain our responsibility.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.bapress.ca/ref/ref-article/1923-7529-2018-02-01-15.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Forbes, Kristin & Fratzscher, Marcel & Kostka, Thomas & Straub, Roland, 2016. "Bubble thy neighbour: Portfolio effects and externalities from capital controls," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-104.
    2. Edelen, Roger M. & Evans, Richard B. & Kadlec, Gregory B., 2012. "Disclosure and agency conflict: Evidence from mutual fund commission bundling," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 308-326.
    3. Eric Zitzewitz, 2003. "Who Cares About Shareholders? Arbitrage-Proofing Mutual Funds," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 245-280, October.
    4. Tom Nohel & Z. Jay Wang & Lu Zheng, 2010. "Side-by-Side Management of Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(6), pages 2342-2373, June.
    5. Black, Bernard S. & de Carvalho, Antonio Gledson & Gorga, Érica, 2012. "What matters and for which firms for corporate governance in emerging markets? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK countries)," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 934-952.
    6. Chamon, Marcos & Garcia, Márcio, 2016. "Capital controls in Brazil: Effective?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 163-187.
    7. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    8. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:5:p:1589-1622 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432.
    10. Berggrun, Luis & Lizarzaburu, Edmundo, 2015. "Fund flows and performance in Brazil," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 199-207.
    11. Marco Antonio Laes & Marcos Eugênio da Silva, 2014. "Performance of mutual equity funds in Brazil – A bootstrap analysis," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 15(3), pages 294-306.
    12. Varga, Gyorgy & Wengert, Maxim, 2010. "The growth and size of the Brazilian mutual fund industry," MPRA Paper 21581, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Joseph Chen & Harrison Hong & Ming Huang & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 2004. "Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1276-1302, December.
    14. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1993. "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-56, February.
    15. Vikram Nanda, 2004. "Family Values and the Star Phenomenon: Strategies of Mutual Fund Families," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(3), pages 667-698.
    16. Fama, Eugene F & MacBeth, James D, 1973. "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 607-636, May-June.
    17. José‐Miguel Gaspar & Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, 2006. "Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 73-104, February.
    18. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. "Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
    19. Nanda, Vikram K. & Wang, Z. Jay & Zheng, Lu, 2009. "The ABCs of mutual funds: On the introduction of multiple share classes," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 329-361, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hung, Pi-Hsia & Lien, Donald & Kuo, Ming-Sin, 2020. "Window dressing in equity mutual funds," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 338-354.
    2. Clemens Sialm & T. Mandy Tham, 2016. "Spillover Effects in Mutual Fund Companies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(5), pages 1472-1486, May.
    3. Moreno, David & Rodríguez, Rosa & Zambrana, Rafael, 2018. "Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 567-587.
    4. Casavecchia, Lorenzo & Tiwari, Ashish, 2016. "Cross trading by investment advisers: Implications for mutual fund performance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 99-130.
    5. Chang, Xiaochen & Guo, Songlin & Huang, Junkai, 2022. "Kidnapped mutual funds: Irrational preference of naive investors and fund incentive distortion," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    6. Nanda, Vikram K. & Wang, Z. Jay & Zheng, Lu, 2009. "The ABCs of mutual funds: On the introduction of multiple share classes," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 329-361, July.
    7. Cuthbertson, Keith & Nitzsche, Dirk & O'Sullivan, Niall, 2016. "A review of behavioural and management effects in mutual fund performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 162-176.
    8. Agarwal, Vikas & Ma, Linlin, 2013. "Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 13-10, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    9. Haoyue Zhang & Dayong Lv & Wenfeng Wu, 2022. "Why do bank‐affiliated mutual funds perform better in China?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(5), pages 4755-4782, December.
    10. Chan, Chia-Ying & Chen, Hsuan-Chi & Chiang, Yu Hsuan & Lai, Christine W., 2017. "Fund selection in target date funds," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 197-209.
    11. Casavecchia, Lorenzo, 2016. "Fund managers' herding and the sensitivity of fund flows to past performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 205-221.
    12. David Hunter & Zhen Sun & Karen Benson, 2020. "The Exclusive Role of Centralized Fund Family Management," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 199-236, December.
    13. Alexander Kempf & Stefan Ruenzi, 2008. "Family Matters: Rankings Within Fund Families and Fund Inflows," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1‐2), pages 177-199, January.
    14. Yong Chen & Nan Qin, 2017. "The Behavior of Investor Flows in Corporate Bond Mutual Funds," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(5), pages 1365-1384, May.
    15. Jun, Xiao & Li, Mingsheng & Yugang, Chen, 2017. "Catering to behavioral demand for dividends and its potential agency issue," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 46(PB), pages 269-291.
    16. Agarwal, Vikas & Ma, Linlin & Mullally, Kevin, 2015. "Managerial multitasking in the mutual fund industry," CFR Working Papers 13-10 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    17. Blake, David & Caulfield, Tristan & Ioannidis, Christos & Tonks, Ian, 2014. "Improved inference in the evaluation of mutual fund performance using panel bootstrap methods," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 183(2), pages 202-210.
    18. Servaes, Henri & Sigurdsson, Kari, 2022. "The Costs and Benefits of Performance Fees in Mutual Funds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    19. Lan, Chunhua & Moneta, Fabio & Wermers, Russ, 2018. "Holding Horizon: A New Measure of Active Investment Management," CFR Working Papers 15-06, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), revised 2018.
    20. Tatiana Didier & Roberto Rigobon & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2013. "Unexploited Gains From International Diversification: Patterns Of Portfolio Holdings Around The World," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1562-1583, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exclusive mutual funds; Conflict of interest; Delegated investment management; Agency conflicts; 4-factor alpha;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bap:journl:180201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Carlson (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.bapress.ca .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.