Coercive diplomacy against Libya: from Reagan’s counter-terrorism strategy to the coalition efforts in toppling Gaddafi

This paper examines thirty-year genesis of the US-Libyan confrontation and analyzes applied coercive diplomacy that has been marked by quite turbulent reversals. Reagan`s counter-terrorism strategy from the 1980s was largely determined and shaped by the Cold War environment. The colossal changes followed by the collapse of the USSR had a significant impact on Gaddafi`s behavior who rejected his own revolutionary rhetoric, terrorism, WMD, and joined a coalition in a Global War on Terrorism and embraced a liberal model of open market economy. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011, Libya found herself once again in the role of a rogue state. Gaddafi rejected to step aside and to leave Libya what lead to materialization of his longtime fear and foresight – allied international forces intervened in Libya and rebels killed Gaddafi in November 2011. This analysis points out that Gaddafi was successful in complying with the requirements of the West by applying the quid pro quo principle, while at the same time the US strategies were taking into account the principle of limited demands. However, in the last phase in which a zero-sum game environment was created an absolute resistance was the only rational option for Gaddafi.