The post-cold war coercive diplomacy – Balkan wars and rough states: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq

This paper analyzes four cases of coercive diplomacy each representing one aspect of contemporary security threats: territorial aggression motivated by nationalist and ethnic aspirations (Bosnia), aggression motivated by self-determination (Kosovo), terrorism (Afghanistan) and weapons of mass destruction (Iraq). The aim of the analysis is to identify factors that had impact on the outcome (success/failure) of coercive strategy. Jentleson cost benefit model based on the criteria of proportionality, reciprocity and credibility is used as the criterion for valuing outcome. The successfull aplication od coercive diplomacy in Bosnia played a major role in creating Kosovo`s coercive strategy witch is regarded as a marginal success due to continuance of the air campaign. Coercive diplomacy in cases of Afganistan and Iraq had faild and goals were achieved through application of brute force. Taking into account the results of the analysis that points to the conclusion that coercive diplomacy, despite conceptual simplicity, is a complex strategy whose outcome is influenced by a number of contextual variables with rather ambivalent character, the purpose of this paper is to comprehend the effectiveness and perspectives of the applicability of Jentlenson model in verification of success or failure of coercive strategy.