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Empirical Research About The Market For Corporate Control In Republic Of Croatia

Author

Listed:
  • Davor Filipovic

    (University of Zagreb)

  • Marijan Cingula

    (University of Zagreb)

  • Darko Tipuric

    (University of Zagreb)

Abstract

The market for corporate control can be viewed as an exogenous organizational variable that puts pressure on managers to behave and make investment decisions that are coherent with the interests of shareholders. With the respect to the fact that there is a lack of researches in the Republic of Croatia regarding the impact of the market for corporate control on the performance of the target companies and taking into consideration that poor effectiveness of the management for a longer period of time results in poor company performance, this paper will test the hypothesis the hypothesis according to which companies that have a below average profitability in its industry, over a longer period of time, are more likely to become takeover targets as compared to other companies in the industry. This paper also examines the impact of the market for corporate control on the performance of target companies after the takeover.

Suggested Citation

  • Davor Filipovic & Marijan Cingula & Darko Tipuric, 2011. "Empirical Research About The Market For Corporate Control In Republic Of Croatia," Economic Thought and Practice, Department of Economics and Business, University of Dubrovnik, vol. 20(2), pages 385-396, december.
    • Handle: RePEc:avo:emipdu:v:20:y:2011:i:2:p:385-396
    as

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    File URL: https://hrcak.srce.hr/clanak/112265
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
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    6. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
    7. Jarrell, Gregg A & Brickley, James A & Netter, Jeffry M, 1988. "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 49-68, Winter.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    market for corporate control; takeover; empirical research; Republic of Croatia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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