The Effect of IFRS, Information Asymmetry and Corporate Governance on the Quality of Accounting Information

This paper investigates the relationship between the information asymmetry, the ownership structure, the pledge of directors-supervisor, respectively, and the quality of accounting information under different accounting standards. By considering A and B stock market of China, which apply China GAAP and IFRS, we discuss whether IFRS can reduce negative effects of the information asymmetry, the ownership structure, the pledge of directors, and furthermore promote the quality of accounting information effectively. The findings provide other countries will use IFRS as a reference. First, we find that IFRS improves the predictive value and timeliness, and it can’t influences representational faithfulness significantly. Second, the information asymmetry degrades the quality of accounting information. Nevertheless, IFRS can improve the information asymmetry but promote the quality of accounting information is nonsignificantly. Third, state ownership, manager ownership, blockholder and directors-supervisor ownership would affect the quality of accounting information. IFRS would restrain negative effect of state ownership, manager ownership, blockholder and directors-supervisor ownership and could enhance predictive value and timeliness. Finally, the pledge of directors-supervisor would reduce the quality of accounting information. However, IFRS can confine negative effects of the pledge of directors-supervisor but can’t promote the quality of accounting information significantly. As a result, adopting IFRS could enhance the quality of accounting information significantly. Nevertheless, IFRS need to reduce information asymmetry and use corporate governance mechanism to promote the quality of accounting information. The findings of this paper can provide IFRS’s institution and regulator promoting and using IFRS system as a reference.