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Effective Privacy Management in Kazakhstan: Privatization or Nationalization?

Author

Listed:
  • B. T. Chereyeva*

    (University of Narzhoz Almaty city, Republic of Kazakhstan)

  • G. M. Duzelbayeva

    (Candidate of economical sciences, Kostanay Engineering and Economic University named after M. Dulatov)

  • O. I. Malyarenko

    (Candidate of economical sciences, Chelyabinsk State University, Kostanay branch)

  • M. M. Ryskulova

    (Candidate Economical Sciences, Narxoz University)

Abstract

The change in the structure of ownership in the economic system is capable of determining the vector of economic development for a long time, since ownership of property brings relatively higher incomes than other types of activity. Privatization and nationalization are instruments that influence this structure. To date, the available empirical data are important, but they are diverse, many conclusions have been obtained on a very limited number of factors, are reliable mathematically, prove to be inauthentic in content, and are found in the same economy, completely incorrect, for example in Kazakhstan or other CIS countries. The purpose of this paper is to show how these two instruments were realized in the example of Kazakhstan, as the country in the shortest time carried out the reform of the transformation of the central management system and how effectively the established theories of property management in the economy.

Suggested Citation

  • B. T. Chereyeva* & G. M. Duzelbayeva & O. I. Malyarenko & M. M. Ryskulova, 2018. "Effective Privacy Management in Kazakhstan: Privatization or Nationalization?," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 4(12), pages 685-691, 12-2018.
    • Handle: RePEc:arp:tjssrr:2018:p:685-691
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987. "Privatization, information and incentives," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 567-585.
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    4. Sharipov, Timur, 2010. "Results so far and prospects of Kazakhstan passenger rail franchising," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 19-35.
    5. Bernardo Bortolotti & Paolo Pinotti, 2003. "The Political Economy of Privatization," Working Papers 2003.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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