IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aph/ajpbhl/1998885745-748_4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Keeping competition fair for health insurance: How the Irish beat back risk-rated policies

Author

Listed:
  • Light, D.W.

Abstract

Objectives: This paper describes how ireland created a level playing field for competition in health insurance, the strategies of a major insurer to introduce risk-rated policies that would segment the market, the successful campaign to block these policies, and the policy implications of the European Union requirement of competition in health insurance. Methods. Policy documents, interviews, and press reports were analyzed. Results. The minister of health forced the commercial insurer to withdraw its policies and replace them with community-rated policies. Conclusions. Because it is easier and more profitable for insurers to engage in risk selection than to become more efficient, beneficial competition in health insurance markets is extremely difficult to create. Carefully drawn rules and monitoring are required to overcome inherent causes of market failure. The current enthusiasm for saving money through competitive schemes in health insurance seems likely to produce higher costs and greater inequality.

Suggested Citation

  • Light, D.W., 1998. "Keeping competition fair for health insurance: How the Irish beat back risk-rated policies," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 88(5), pages 745-748.
    • Handle: RePEc:aph:ajpbhl:1998:88:5:745-748_4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
    2. Bolhaar, Jonneke & Lindeboom, Maarten & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2012. "A dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 669-690.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aph:ajpbhl:1998:88:5:745-748_4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.apha.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.