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Econometrics of Auctions and Nonlinear Pricing

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  • Isabelle Perrigne
  • Quang Vuong

Abstract

This review surveys the growing literature on the econometrics of first-price sealed-bid auctions and nonlinear pricing. The complexity of the economic models has initiated fruitful collaborations between econometrics and empirical research. We review the benchmark models and their extensions, the identification of the model primitives, and their nonparametric and semiparametric estimation. We discuss the future of the field, which goes beyond auctions and nonlinear pricing, as both can be viewed as economic mechanisms for price formation, allocation, and market organization.

Suggested Citation

  • Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2019. "Econometrics of Auctions and Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 27-54, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:11:y:2019:p:27-54
    DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025702
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vasserman, Shoshana & Watt, Mitchell, 2021. "Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Haitian Xie, 2020. "Finite-Sample Average Bid Auction," Papers 2008.10217, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    3. Zincenko, Federico, 2024. "Estimation and inference of seller’s expected revenue in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 241(1).
    4. Daniel Prudencio, 2023. "Productivity in Procurement Auctions of Pavement Contracts in Mexico," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 63-85, August.
    5. Enache, Andreea & Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbai, Erwann, 2023. "A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1564-1588.
    6. Jiaming Mao & Zhesheng Zheng, 2020. "Structural Regularization," Papers 2004.12601, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
    7. Jiaming Mao & Jingzhi Xu, 2020. "Ensemble Learning with Statistical and Structural Models," Papers 2006.05308, arXiv.org.
    8. Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer & Thibaud Vergé, 2021. "Double Marginalization and Vertical Integration," CESifo Working Paper Series 8971, CESifo.
    9. Belev, S. & Veterinarov, V. & Matveev, E., 2023. "Vertical collusion in public procurement: Estimation based on data for R&D composite auctions," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 36-63.
    10. Pasha Andreyanov & Grigory Franguridi, 2021. "Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions," Papers 2106.13856, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    11. Jun, Sung Jae & Zincenko, Federico, 2022. "Testing for risk aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 295-320.

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