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Social norms, solidarity and coordination in the ultimatum game

Author

Listed:
  • Fajfar, Pablo

    (Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas)

  • Beltrani, Mariano

    (Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas)

Abstract

Social norms in ultimatum’s game establish that extremely unequal offers lead to failure. However, under the obedience of the norm, and far from Nash Equilibrium, negotiated wealth is favorable for proposers when information given is incomplete. In our experiment, every participant knew the actions taken by his peers in a context of repeated negotiation. The results show that under these circumstances, receivers sequentially obtain a mayor portion of wealth, which is said to reinforce the norm. The facts show a behavior of solidarity coordination in the latter, but not visible in proposers

Suggested Citation

  • Fajfar, Pablo & Beltrani, Mariano, 2010. "Social norms, solidarity and coordination in the ultimatum game," Revista de Economía Política de Buenos Aires, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas., issue 7-8, pages 179-201, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ake:repba1:y:2010:i:7-8:p:179-201
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