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Why ruling politicians grow rich faster—Rentseeking or selection bias?

Author

Listed:
  • Łukasz Wiktor Olejnik

    (Department of Economics II, Collegium of World Economy, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland
    Department of Economic Analyses, National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, Poland)

Abstract

The high rate of increase of ruling politicians’ wealth has been empirically proven many times. However, in the literature it is almost always assumed that politicians grew rich faster due to political rent-seeking or corruption. The aim of this article is to discuss the assumption whether corruption and rent-seeking is indeed the only possible cause, and to present empirical findings undermining the assumption. The results of the analysis of levels and rate of growth of Polish politicians’ wealth clearly show that the other explanation is the selection of people exercising authority. Based on statistical analysis of 2024 asset declarations of 689 councillors from Polish voivodeship assemblies from two terms in the period of 2010–2018, the paper demonstrates that the different rates of changes of the value of assets of coalition and opposition councillors are at least partly the effect of the selection bias.

Suggested Citation

  • Łukasz Wiktor Olejnik, 2020. "Why ruling politicians grow rich faster—Rentseeking or selection bias?," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 42(1), pages 74-97, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aka:soceco:v:42:y:2020:i:1:p:74-97
    Note: Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the National Bank of Poland.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; asset declaration analysis; selection bias among politicians;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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