Contextualism as a Solution to the Gettier Problem: Revisiting the Definition and Justification of Knowledge

The Gettier problem has significantly reshaped the discourse on the nature of knowledge, challenging the traditional definition of knowledge as Justified True Belief (JTB). This paper explores the philosophical implications of the Gettier problem and its impact on epistemology, focusing on two major responses: internalism and contextualism. Internalism emphasizes the cognitive subject's internal states as the basis for knowledge justification, while contextualism introduces variability in knowledge standards based on conversational and situational contexts. The strengths and limitations of each approach are critically analyzed, with internalism offering clear criteria for justification but struggling with external factors, and contextualism providing flexibility in knowledge attribution while risking subjectivity. The paper also examines how contextualism addresses philosophical skepticism and the Gettier problem by adjusting the criteria for knowledge depending on the context. Ultimately, this manuscript argues that while both internalism and contextualism have contributed to a deeper understanding of knowledge, further refinement of these theories is necessary to address their limitations, particularly regarding objectivity and skepticism.