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Obligations And Penalties Under Lemon Laws: Automobiles Versus Tractors

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  • Centner, Terence J.
  • Wetzstein, Michael E.

Abstract

Distinctive new provisions of tractor lemon laws which create obligations and provide penalties for defective self-propelled agricultural equipment are contrasted with provisions of automobile lemon laws. Lemon-law obligations involve both producers' guarantees to provide consumers with a serviceable vehicle and producers' promise to remedy defects. Due to fewer manufacturer obligations under the tractor lemon laws as opposed to automobile lemon laws, tractors may be expected to have more defects than automobiles. Yet the tractor lemon laws contain fewer penalties in the form of restitution remedies. The inconsistencies of these obligations and penalties suggest tractor laws may be inefficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Centner, Terence J. & Wetzstein, Michael E., 1995. "Obligations And Penalties Under Lemon Laws: Automobiles Versus Tractors," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-11, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30923
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.30923
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    References listed on IDEAS

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