Why All for One Might Not Last Once and for All ? The (Un)Dissimulated Geopolitical and Institutional Competition in a Technology-Tensed European Union

The European Union is portrayed as a realm of international cooperation and coordination, of convergence and cohesion (via freedoms of movement and common policies), retaining ingrained traits such as member states geopolitical competition (with national interests on collision courses, narratives contested, and rivalries in standby, still short of warfare). Known by the buzzword polycrisis , the tangled turbulence made of (post-)pandemic sequels, supply-chain fractures, inflation surges, energy uncertainties, migration pressures, security threats, climate changes, technological disruptions etc. heavily adds to this stress. Next to official calls for unity in the conclave, powered by new deals and more funds , divergent national behaviours emerge as scarcities remain asymmetrical and asynchronous. For instance, the 4.0 industries, allegedly part of the solution, become part of the problem since, for instance, the EU member states are unevenly endowed with strategic resource reserves and are unequally enabled in terms of relations with extra-EU critical suppliers. This article investigates the propensity for geopolitical and institutional competition in an EU claiming a monolithic view/voice globally as against rival US, rebel China or rogue Russia, all this in many regards, including the preparation for technological transformations. Firstly, an original Institutional Economics analysis is applied to the rationales for intra-EU inter-states competition, acknowledging the realities of the worldwide scarcity and spread of a series of technologically-critical resources, which become geopolitically frustrating. Secondly, a line of inquiry will be devoted to de-homogenizing the economic and political types of competition, emphasizing, for the latter, the soft power tools usable by various EU member states, including the appeal to strategic trade , acknowledging its limitations too. Thirdly, the national competitive impulses are scrutinized in a pair of breviloquent case studies: that of ex-colonial powers, activating their residual ties with former dominions, and that of ex-communist countries, resorting to regional formats to gain substance collectively.