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Politikberatung und die Verhaltensökonomie: Eine Fallstudie zu einem schwierigen Verhältnis

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  • Joachim Weimann

Abstract

Normative Theorien erlauben eine andere Art von Erkenntnis als sie die Verhaltensökonomie hervorbringt. So-lange es allein um die Produktion wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts geht, lässt sich zwischen den beiden Methoden der Erkenntnisgewinnung eine effiziente Arbeitsteilung organisieren und der hochdifferenzierte Wissenschafts-betrieb sorgt dafür, dass man sich nicht weiter ins Gehege kommt. Aber was geschieht, wenn ökonomische Er-kenntnis angewendet werden soll, um die Politik zu beraten? Bisher wird in weiten Teilen der Politikberatung die experimentelle Forschung mit dem Hinweis abgelehnt, ihre Ergebnisse ließen sich nicht auf die Realität übertragen. Dabei wird die Frage der externen Validität asymmetrisch behandelt, weil sie für die normative The-orie nicht gestellt wird. Eine Beratung, die den gesamten Fundus ökonomischen Wissens einbezieht, wird an einigen Stellen die Schärfe des politischen Rates, den Ökonomen geben können reduzieren. Aber auch das ge-naue Gegenteil ist möglich. Wenn z. B. die Übertragbarkeit spieltheoretischer Ergebnisse dadurch gestärkt wird, dass man sie mit verhaltensökonomischen Befunden untermauert, dann gewinnt die ökonomische Politikbera-tung erheblich an Überzeugungkraft. In jedem Fall dürfte eine ehrliche Bestandaufnahme und das Eingeständnis eigener Erkenntnisgrenzen die Glaubwürdigkeit ökonomischer Politikberatung erheblich steigern.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Weimann, 2010. "Politikberatung und die Verhaltensökonomie: Eine Fallstudie zu einem schwierigen Verhältnis," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 130(3), pages 279-296.
  • Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqsjb:v130_y2010_i3_q3_p279-296
    DOI: 10.3790/schm.130.3.279
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    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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