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Universal Health Insurance in the Clinton Plan: Coverage as a Tax-Financed Public Good

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  • Mark V. Pauly

Abstract

The financing arrangements embodied in the Clinton health reform plan involve some important differences in the way in which public goods are usually financed. The subsidies to small, low-wage firms mandated to provide benefits distort markets in both labor and products, and offer incentives for the creation of small firms. In addition, the financing scheme implicitly envisions a head tax on families at modest income levels but offers a possible rationale for it. Nevertheless, the main reason for many of the financing features appears to be an attempt to hold down the apparent budgetary cost of universal coverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark V. Pauly, 1994. "Universal Health Insurance in the Clinton Plan: Coverage as a Tax-Financed Public Good," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 45-53, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:8:y:1994:i:3:p:45-53
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.3.45
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.8.3.45
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 5, pages 111-144, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edgar K. Browning, 1999. "The Myth of Fiscal Externalities," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(1), pages 3-18, January.
    2. Bahram Adrangi & Kambiz Raffiee, 1997. "An econometric analysis of health care reform in the U.S," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 3(2), pages 181-192, May.
    3. Alvaro Sandroni & Francesco Squintani, 2007. "Overconfidence, Insurance, and Paternalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1994-2004, December.
    4. Kamran Nayeri, 1995. "Economic Boundaries of Health Care: Factors Influencing Reform Proposals," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 56-82, December.
    5. Wolfgang Buchholz & Birgit Edener & Markus Grabka & Klaus-Dirk Henke & Monika Huber & Hermann Ribhegge & Andreas Ryll & Hans-Jürgen Wagener & Gert G. Wagner, 2001. "Wettbewerb aller Krankenversicherungen kann Qualität verbessern und Kosten des Gesundheitswesens senken," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 247, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Ann Helwege, 1996. "Preventive versus Curative Medicine: A Policy Exercise for the Classroom," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 59-71, January.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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