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Is There a Bias toward Excess in U.S. Government Budgets or Deficits?

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  • Charles L. Schultze

Abstract

Do the political institutions of a majoritarian representative democracy, and in particular those of the United States, systematically produce either levels of public spending or budget deficits that are excessive? Should U.S. political institutions be altered by constitutional amendment to deal with these problems? I will start by examining the issue of public spending, and then turn to the question of budget deficits.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles L. Schultze, 1992. "Is There a Bias toward Excess in U.S. Government Budgets or Deficits?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 25-43, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:6:y:1992:i:2:p:25-43
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.6.2.25
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.6.2.25
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Musgrave, Richard A., 1985. "Excess bias and the nature of budget growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 287-308, December.
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    4. Borcherding, Thomas E., 1985. "The causes of government expenditure growth: A survey of the U.S. evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 359-382, December.
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    7. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 251-278, October.
    8. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71(5), pages 457-457.
    9. Rivlin, Alice M, 1987. "Economics and the Political Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 1-10, March.
    10. Robert Summers & Alan Heston, 1988. "A New Set Of International Comparisons Of Real Product And Price Levels Estimates For 130 Countries, 1950–1985," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 34(1), pages 1-25, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Yves Hénin, 1997. "Soutenabilité des déficits et ajustements budgétaires," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(3), pages 371-395.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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