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Covering the Uninsured in the United States

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  • Jonathan Gruber

Abstract

One of the major social policy issues facing the United States in the first decade of the twenty-first century is the large number of Americans lacking health insurance. This article surveys the major economic issues around covering the uninsured. I review the facts on insurance coverage and the nature of the uninsured; explore explanations for why the United States has such a large, and growing, uninsured population; and discuss why we should care if individuals are uninsured. I then examine policy options to address the problem of the uninsured, beginning with a discussion of the key issues and available evidence and then turning to estimates from a micro-simulation model of the impact of alternative interventions to increase insurance coverage.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Gruber, 2008. "Covering the Uninsured in the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 571-606, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:46:y:2008:i:3:p:571-606
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.46.3.571
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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