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Auditability in School Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Aram Grigoryan
  • Markus Möller

Abstract

In centralized public school admissions, participants may not fully observe other participants' preference rankings and priorities. In this paper, we evaluate prominent assignment rules in terms of their auditability properties. We show that Serial Dictatorship and Immediate Acceptance rules are maximally auditable, in a sense that any deviation from running them as promised can be detected with only two applicants' private information. The Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles rules are minimally auditable, in a sense that some deviations will not be detected unless one has close to full information about the preference rankings and priorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Aram Grigoryan & Markus Möller, 2024. "Auditability in School Choice," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 114, pages 492-496, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:114:y:2024:p:492-96
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20241064
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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