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Repression and Repertoires

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  • Stephen Morris
  • Mehdi Shadmehr

Abstract

We formalize Tilly's concept of repertoires of collective action and analyze how state repression affects the variety of observed contentious actions. When repression accelerates with higher levels of antiregime actions (convex repression structure), opposition leaders tend to call for many different forms of contentious actions, thereby generating a wider repertoire. In contrast, when repression decelerates with higher contentious actions (concave repression structure, including indiscriminate repression), opposition leaders tend to call for just one form of contentious action, thereby generating a narrower repertoire. Methodologically, we deliver an analysis for settings in which coordination and delegation are intertwined.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Morris & Mehdi Shadmehr, 2024. "Repression and Repertoires," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 413-433, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:6:y:2024:i:3:p:413-33
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20230402
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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