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Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility

Author

Listed:
  • Jesse Schreger
  • Pierre Yared
  • Emilio Zaratiegui

Abstract

We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt issuance is nonmonotonic because increased hawkishness reduces the benefit from fiscal stimulus while simultaneously increasing real debt capacity. Starting from high levels of hawkishness (dovishness), a marginal increase in the central bank's anti-inflation bias decreases (increases) debt issuance.

Suggested Citation

  • Jesse Schreger & Pierre Yared & Emilio Zaratiegui, 2024. "Central Bank Credibility and Fiscal Responsibility," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 377-394, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:6:y:2024:i:3:p:377-94
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20230263
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric & Plantin, Guillaume, 2024. "The central bank, the treasury, or the market: Which one determines the price level?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E12 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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