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Competitive Bidding in Drug Procurement: Evidence from China

Author

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  • Shengmao Cao
  • Lisa Xuejie Yi
  • Chuan Yu

Abstract

We study the equilibrium effects of introducing competitive bidding in drug procurement. In 2019, China introduced a competitive bidding program where drug companies bid for a prespecified procurement quantity in nine provinces. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show the program reduced average drug prices by 47.4 percent. Generic drugs won most bids and cut prices by 75.0 percent. We develop an equilibrium model to quantify the trade-off between lower prices and potential choice distortions. Competitive bidding increases consumer welfare if policymakers believe consumers should value branded and bioequivalent generic drugs equally. The program also reduced government expenditure on insurance by 19.8 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Shengmao Cao & Lisa Xuejie Yi & Chuan Yu, 2024. "Competitive Bidding in Drug Procurement: Evidence from China," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 481-513, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:481-513
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220505
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
    • P25 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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