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Tripping through Hoops: The Effect of Violating Compulsory Government Procedures

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  • Natalia Emanuel
  • Helen Ho

Abstract

Millions of Americans must navigate complex government procedures under the threat of punishment. Violating these requirements can lead to poverty traps or deepening legal system involvement. We use a field experiment to estimate the effect of failing to appear for court on subsequent legal contact. The treatments reduce failure to appear by 40 percent. Using treatment assignment to identify the causal impact of minor procedural violations, we find no effect on arrests. However, for lower-level cases, violations increase fines and fees paid by 59 percent or $79, equivalent to a high-interest loan, showing that minor procedural violations can be costly.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalia Emanuel & Helen Ho, 2024. "Tripping through Hoops: The Effect of Violating Compulsory Government Procedures," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 290-313, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:16:y:2024:i:3:p:290-313
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220331
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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