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Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance in Brazil

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  • François Gerard
  • Gustavo Gonzaga

Abstract

It is widely believed that the presence of a large informal sector increases the efficiency cost of social programs in developing countries. We evaluate such claims for the case of unemployment insurance (UI) by combining an optimal UI framework with comprehensive data from Brazil. Using quasi-experimental variation in potential UI duration, we find clear evidence for the usual moral hazard problem that UI reduces incentives to return to a formal job. Yet, the associated efficiency cost is lower than it is in the United States, and it is lower in labor markets with higher informality within Brazil. This is because formal reemployment rates are lower to begin with where informality is higher, so that a larger share of workers would draw UI benefits absent any moral hazard. In sum, efficiency concerns may actually become more relevant as an economy formalizes.

Suggested Citation

  • François Gerard & Gustavo Gonzaga, 2021. "Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance in Brazil," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 167-206, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:13:y:2021:i:3:p:167-206
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180072
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
    • J46 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Informal Labor Market
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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