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Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent Laferrière
  • Joao Montez
  • Catherine Roux
  • Christian Thöni

Abstract

We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Laferrière & Joao Montez & Catherine Roux & Christian Thöni, 2024. "Multigame Contact: A Double-Edged Sword for Cooperation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 39-61, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:39-61
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210377
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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