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Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Author

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  • David J. Cooper
  • John H. Kagel

Abstract

We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This reflects the improvisational nature of teams' decision making. (iii) Increasing cooperation was primarily driven by teams unilaterally cooperating in the hope of inducing their opponent to cooperate.

Suggested Citation

  • David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2023. "Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 114-145, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:15:y:2023:i:4:p:114-45
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210012
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    Cited by:

    1. Maximilian Andres, 2024. "Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication," CEPA Discussion Papers 75, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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